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AS IF WE HAD ENOUGH TO WORRY ABOUT... ATTOR-
NEYS AND THE FEDERAL FAIR DEBT COLLECTION
PRACTICES ACT: SUPREME COURT RULES ON FOR-
MER ATTORNEY EXEMPTION
I. INTRODUCTION
This article provides an overview of the Federal Fair Debt
Collection Practices Act (hereinafter the "Act" or "FDCPA"), a rel-
atively unknown statute which regulates the collection practices
of debt collectors while providing protection to consumer debtors.'
The purpose of this article is to educate attorneys by making them
aware of how they may qualify as "debt collectors" under the
FDCPA. Additionally, this article may serve as a guide for attor-
neys who qualify as "debt collectors," detailing the applicable pro-
visions with which they must comply to avoid liability. Whether
you are a solo practitioner or a member of a large firm, regardless
of the state in which you currently practice, if you collect con-
sumer debts, you need to be aware of this statute and how you
may fall prey to its provisions.
This article briefly traces the history of the FDCPA, from the
original legislation enacted in 1977 to the 1986 Amendments, and
further provides an overview of appellate courts' previous inter-
pretations of the Act's applicability to attorneys. From here, the
article summarizes Heintz v. Jenkins, a 1995 United States
Supreme Court decision holding attorneys who meet the FDCPA's
statutory definition of "debt collector," subject to the Act's provi-
sions.2 Further discussion of exactly what qualifies as a "debt"
and as a "debt collector" under the Act is presented in correlation
with a summary of the main provisions of the FDCPA that attor-
neys need beware. These provisions are broken down in to four
categories: 1) venue restrictions, 2) communications with the
debtor, 3) communications with third parties concerning the debt,
and 4) potential civil liability under the Act. This article further
discusses how state debt collection statutes apply in concert with
the FDCPA, followed by a brief mention of tort actions to which
attorneys could be subject, when the FDCPA does not apply.
1. 15 U.S.C. § 1692 (1994).
2. Heintz v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 1489 (1995).
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Finally, a summary of North Carolina's statute concerning debt
collection is presented, with key topics highlighted.
II. HISTORY OF THE FEDERAL FAIR DEBT COLLECTION
PRACTICES ACT
A. The 1977 Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act
Congress enacted the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices
Act in 1977, after discovering abundant evidence of abusive,
deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices by debt collectors.'
These practices contributed to the rising number of personal
bankruptcies, marital dissolutions, job losses, and invasions of pri-
vacy.4 Additionally, interstate commerce was adversely affected
by corrupt debt collectors.5
The FDCPA's purpose was to eliminate abusive debt collec-
tion practices, and to promote consistent state action in order to
protect consumers against those who abuse the debt collection
process. 6 Moreover, the Act promotes fair ethical collection prac-
3. See 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692-1692o. See also Miller v. Payco-General American
Credits, 943 F.2d 482, 483-84 (4th Cir. 1991); Pipiles .v. Credit Bureau of
Lockport Section, 886 F.2d 22, 27 (2d Cir. 1989) (stating section 1692e was
enacted "to prevent abusive, deceptive, and unfair debt collection practices").
4. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692:
Congressional findings and declaration of purpose
(a) There is abundant evidence of the use of abusive, deceptive, and
unfair debt collection practices by many debt collectors. Abusive debt
collection practices contribute to the number of personal bankruptcies,
to marital instability, to the loss of jobs, and to invasions of individual
privacy.
(b) Existing laws and procedures for redressing these injuries are
inadequate to protect consumers.
(c) Means other than misrepresentation or other abusive debt collection
practices are available for the effective collection of debts.
(d) Abusive debt collection practices are carried on to a substantial
extent in interstate commerce and through means and instrumentalities
of such commerce. Even where abusive debt collection practices are
purely intrastate in character, they nevertheless directly affect
interstate commerce.
(e) It is the purpose of this subchapter to eliminate abusive debt
collection practices by debt collectors, to insure that those debt collectors
who refrain from using abusive debt collection practices are not
competitively disadvantaged, and to promote consistent State action to
protect consumers against debt collection abuses.
5. Id.
6. Id.
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tices, by insuring that those debt collectors who do not abuse the
collection process will not suffer a competitive disadvantage.'
B. The 1986 Amendments to the FDCPA
The original Act exempted attorneys from the statutory defi-
nition of "debt collector" because their debt collection activities
were considered incidental to the practice of law. Local bar
associations thereby inherited the duty to protect consumers from
attorneys engaged in abusive collection practices." However,
Congress discovered that more and more attorneys were engaging
in the debt collection process. These attorneys used tactics that
ordinary debt collectors were barred from using, due to attorneys
exempt status under the 1977 Act.9
In 1986, Congress amended the original FDCPA, eliminating
the exemption which previously excluded from the statutory defi-
nition of "debt collector" any attorney-at-law collecting debts on
behalf of, or in the name of a client. 10
C. Jurisdictions: Holdings and Conflicts Concerning
Interpretation of the 1986 Amendments
Since the adoption of the 1986 Amendments, appellate deci-
sions regarding the status of the former attorney exemption have
resulted in varying views among the circuits.
Addressing the issue in Paulemon v. Tobin, the Second Cir-
cuit Court of Appeals held that attorneys may qualify as debt col-
lectors under the FDCPA.' 1 In that case, the plaintiff-debtor
7. Id. See also Johnson v. NCB Collection Srvc., 799 F. Supp. 1298, 1303 (D.
Conn. 1992) (quoting S. Rep. No. 382, 95th Cong., 1st Sess. 1, 2, (1977), reprinted
in 1977 U.S.C.C-A.N. 1695, 1696). The Committee on Banking, Housing, and
Urban Affairs, which reported on the Act and recommended it to the Senate,
found that debt collection abuse by third party debt collectors is "a widespread
and serious national problem." Id.
8. See H.R. Rep. No. 405, 99th Cong., 2d. Sess. 3-7 (1985), reprinted in 1986
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1752-61. See also Henry D. Menghini and Jason D. Ponfil, Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act: The Debtor Strikes Back, 47 J. Mo. B. 115 (1991).
9. H.R. Rep. No. 99-405, supra note 8.
10. 1986 Amendment 1 Par. (6). Pub.L. 99-361: In provision preceding
subpar. (A) substituted "clause (F)" for "clause (G)", in subpar. (E) inserted "and"
after "creditor;", struck out subpar. (F), which excluded from the term "debt
collector" any attorney-at-law collecting a debt as an attorney on behalf of and in
the name of a client, and redesignated subpar. (G) as (F). Effective Date: Section
effective upon the expiration of six months after Sept. 20, 1977, see § 818 of
Pub.L. 90-321, set out as an Effective Date note under § 1692 of this title.
11. Paulemon v. Tobin, 30 F.3d 307 (2d Cir. 1994).
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owed a debt to a local hospital for medical services.12  The hospi-
tal's retained attorney sent a letter entitled "Institution of Litiga-
tion" to the plaintiff-debtor's attorney, requesting notice of
whether that attorney still represented the plaintiff-debtor, and if
so, to thereby accept service of process.1 "
The plaintiff-debtor filed a complaint against the attorney,
alleging that the letter violated the FDCPA by threatening to com-
municate directly with a represented person, and by making
deceptive and misleading statements.14 Granting a motion for
dismissal, the District Court held that the attorney had acted as
an attorney in the course of litigation, not as a "debt collector" as
defined by the FDCPA, thus not liable under the Act.1 5
The Second Circuit Court of Appeals, in reversing the lower
court, held the creditor's attorney to be a "debt collector" liable
under the FDCPA, even if the Act contained a litigation exemp-
tion, because the letter failed to qualify as a litigation activity suf-
ficient to trigger any such exception.' 6  Although the court
reversed on other grounds, the court expressed considerable doubt
as to the existence of a litigation exemption.' 7
12. Id. at 308.
13. Id. at 308. The letter stated:
Our firm has been engaged by the above-named client to institute suit
against your client. It is our understanding that you represent this
individual and would be willing to accept service on their behalf.
We will assume that you no longer represent this individual if you
do not notify us of your continued representation within seven (7) days
from the date of this correspondence and in such case, we will contact
this individual directly.
Thank you for your attention to this matter.
Id.
On the reverse side of the date, the letter included a printed list of specific
federal rights and a statement that read: "THIS IS AN ATTEMPT TO
COLLECT A DEBT. ANY INFORMATION OBTAINED WILL BE USED FOR
THAT PURPOSE." Id.
14. Id.
15. Id.
16. Id. at 309-310.
17. Id. at 310. The 2nd Circuit in Paulemon never reached the issue of
whether the FDCPA impliedly contains a litigation exemption. Id. Instead, the
court determined the attorney's actions were not "litigation." Therefore it was
unnecessary to rule on the exemption. Id.
The court did, however, review recent decisions from other circuits: Jenkins
v. Heintz, 25 F.3d 536 (7th Cir. 1994); Fox v. Citicorp Credit Service, 15 F.3d
1507 (9th Cir. 1994); Scott v. Jones, 964 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1992).
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The Sixth Circuit addressed the issue in Green v. Hocking.'8
In Green, the plaintiff-debtor used a credit card to make a
purchase at a local appliance store. 19 The credit card company
refused to accept the charge, so the appliance store assigned the
debt to a collection corporation.20 The attorney for the corporation
without first contacting the debtor, filed a complaint in state court
against the debtor, alleging the debtor owed a total amount of
approximately three hundred dollars, which included interest cal-
culated at eighteen percent.2' One week later, the attorney filed
an amended complaint using a five percent interest rate, acknowl-
edging the eighteen percent rate used in the original complaint to
be incorrect, because neither the corporation nor the original
appliance store contracted for such a rate.22
Debtor-plaintiff then sued the attorney in federal court, alleg-
ing violations of sections 1692e(2)(A)-1692f(1) of the FDCPA for
misstating the total amount of debt owed, due to the attorney's
incorrect calculation of the appropriate interest rate.23  Dis-
missing the action, the District Court held the attorney immune
from liability under the FDCPA because his activities were of a
legal nature covered by the litigation exemption under the Act.24
The Sixth Circuit Court of Appeals addressed only the issue of
whether the FDCPA covers an attorney functioning solely in a
legal capacity.25
After examining the context of the FDCPA, the court held
that the Act was not intended to govern attorneys engaged solely
18. 9 F.3d 18 (6th Cir. 1993).
19. Id. at 19.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. Id. at 20.
23. Id. The complaint alleged violations of 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A) which
proscribes the false representation of the amount of any debt, and 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692f(1) which proscribes the collection, or attempted collection, of any
amount, including interest "unless such amount is expressly authorized by the
agreement creating the debt or permitted by law." Id.
24. Green, 9 F.3d at 20.
25. Id. The court distinguished Frey v. Gangwish II, 970 F.2d 1516 (6th Cir.
1992), and Crossley v. Liebermann, 868 F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1989). In Frey, the
attorney acted as a post-judgment bill collector, and the issue of exemption was
never raised. In Crossley, the attorney sent a letter, rather than filing a lawsuit.
Neither case was found to be applicable to the narrow question of whether
attorneys functioning solely in a legal capacity are covered by the Act. Green, 9
F.3d at 20, n.3.
1996]
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in the practice of law.2 6  Even though the 1986 amendments to
the FDCPA did away with the attorney exemption, the purpose
was to close a loophole that allowed an attorney engaged in the
same unsavory debt collection activities as other debt collectors, to
avoid liability due solely to his possession of a law degree.27 Con-
gress did not intend to prohibit attorneys from engaging in normal
law practices; such a conclusion would result in absurd out-
comes.2" In conclusion, the Court relied on the original drafters'
26. Green, 9 F.3d at 21. The Green court read the statute as a whole, since
the meaning of statutory language depends on context. Id. (relying on King v. St.
Vincent's Hosp., 502 U.S. 215 (1991)). See Chemical Mfrs. Ass'n v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 470 U.S. 116, 125-126 (1985) (holding in those
rare cases where the literal reading of the statute is unambiguous, courts may
seek extrinsic evidence of legislative intent when the literal interpretation makes
little sense, renders the statute ineffective, leads to irrational consequences, or is
otherwise demonstrably at odds with the true intentions of the statute's drafters.
In such cases, the intention of the drafters, rather than the literal language,
controls); Arizona Governing Comm'n for Tax Deferred Annuity & Deferred
Compensation Plans v. Norris, 463 U.S. 1073, 1108 (1983) (holding that under
appropriate circumstances, the court should test the statute's plain meaning
with legislative history, policy, and overall statutory scheme). See also United
States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S. 235 (1989).
27. Green, 9 F.3d at 21. Before the 1986 FDCPA amendment went into effect,
attorneys advertised to creditors that they could do what other debt collectors
could no longer do because of their status as an attorneys. Attorneys could make
"late night telephone calls to consumers, calls to consumers' employers
concerning the consumers' debts," and "disclose the consumer's debt to third
parties" without worrying about falling prey to the FDCPA. H.R. Rep. No. 405,
supra note 8, at 1754-57.
28. Green, 9 F.3d at 21. The court relied on various sections of FDCPA as
examples of absurd results. For example, 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b) provides that
collection efforts must cease if, within thirty days of receiving a communication,
the debtor disputes the amount owed, and 15 U.S.C. § 1692c provides that all
debt communications must cease once the debtor makes such a request. A literal
reading of these provisions would mean that "once a creditor initiates a lawsuit,
and the consumer responds that he does not owe the amount alleged, or that he
wishes to cease communications, it would be unlawful to bring a motion for
summary judgment." Green, 9 F.3d at 21. The court reasoned that "if an
attorney first writes a letter, and the consumer asks that communications cease,
it would be unlawful to instigate a lawsuit." Id.
Further, 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b) prevents a debt collector from communicating
with any third party pertaining to the consumer's debt. This portion of the Act,
would make it unlawful for "an attorney to communicate with the court or the
clerk's office by filing suit." The court also cited section 1692e(5) which makes it
unlawful to threaten "to take any action that cannot legally be taken or that is
not intended to be taken." If a lawsuit is brought, and the consumer prevails to
any extent, it appears that the law has been broken, as the creditor took an
170 [Vol. 18:165
6
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss1/4
FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES
intent to have a litigation exception for attorneys over the plain
language of the statute.29
Similarly, in Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Keating, the court held that
the 1986 Amendments do not reach all legal activity engaged in by
attorneys.30  By removing the attorney exemption, Congress did
not intend to sweep within the meaning of the term "debt collec-
tor," attorneys acting as legal counsel for their clients. 31 Addition-
ally, the court in National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Hartel , held a law
firm not to be a "debt collector" under the FDCPA since it engaged
in activities purely legal in nature, without seeking any
reimbursements.3 2
The Fourth Circuit Court of Appeals, addressing the issue in
Scott v. Jones, reached a conclusion contrary to that of the Sixth
Circuit. 3 The Scott court determined an attorney to be subject to
the provisions of the FDCPA, if the attorney meets the Act's defi-
nition of a "debt collector."34
action that apparently "cannot legally be taken" as a result of the judgment.
Green, 9 F.3d at 21. The Green court also noted that:
[Aiccording to Representative Annunzio, the sole sponsor of the 1986
amendments, "the removal of the attorney exemption will not interfere
with the practice of law by the Nation's attorneys." Annunzio further
stated that "only collection activities, not legal activities, are covered by
the act .... The act applies to attorneys when they are collecting debts,
not when they are performing tasks of a legal nature .... The act only
regulates the conduct of debt collectors, it does not prevent creditors,
through their attorneys, from pursuing any legal remedies available to
them."
Green, 9 F.3d at 21 (citations omitted). See also Federal Trade Commission,
Statements of General Policy or Interpretation: Staff Commentary on the Fair
Debt Collection Practices Act, 53 Fed. Reg. 50,097, 50,100 (1988) (stating
"attorneys ... whose practice is limited to legal activities are not covered by the
FDCPA") [hereinafter Staff Commentary].
29. Green, 9 F.3d at 22 (citing United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489 U.S.
235, 242 (1989) which stated "[w]e are mindful that in those rare cases where the
intent of the statute's drafters is clearly contrary to the plain language, the
intention of the drafters, rather than the strict language, controls"). See also
North Howen B'd of Educ. v. Bell, 456 U.S. 512, 526-27 (1982) (stating "while the
views of the sponsors of legislation are by no means conclusive, they are entitled
to considerable weight").
30. Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Keating, 753 F. Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1990).
31. Id. at 1142.
32. National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Hartel, 741 F. Supp. 1139, 1141 (S.D.N.Y.
1990).
33. Scott v. Jones, 964 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1992).
34. Id. at 315.
1996]
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In Scott, the debtor brought a class action suit against an
attorney and his law firm for violating the venue provisions of the
FDCPA 5  The attorney was retained by two banks to represent
their bank card divisions in lawsuits on delinquent credit card
accounts.3 6 In an effort to collect the debt, the attorney filed suit
in the General District Court for the City of Richmond against the
debtor, a resident of Lynchburg, Virginia, in order to recover the
past due balance on the debtor's credit card account.3 7 Objecting
to the Richmond venue under the FDCPA, the debtor filed a class
action suit against the attorney and his law firm alleging viola-
tions of the FDCPA's venue provisions. 8
The attorney argued as an affirmative defense that he was
not a "debt collector" under the FDCPA, and thereby he did not
have to comply with the Act's venue provisions.3 9  The district
court, however, held that the attorney fell within the plain mean-
ing of the Act's definition of "debt collector," and was thus subject
to liability for violating the Act's venue provisions.40
Affirming the district court, the Fourth Circuit Court of
Appeals held the "venue restrictions of section 1692i, apply only to
legal actions initiated by 'debt collectors,' as defined in the
FDCPA."41 To determine whether the attorney was a "debt collec-
tor," the court looked to the statute for the definition of a "debt
collector."42 Finding the statutory language to be "clear and
35. Id.
36. Id.
37. Id. The debtor sought actual damages, statutory damages, attorney's
fees, and injunctive relief. For a discussion of damages available for violations of
the FDCPA, see infra part IV.D.
38. Scott, 964 F.2d at 315. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1692i(a) which states:
Any debt collector who brings any legal action on a debt against any
consumer shall . . .bring such action only in the judicial district or
similar legal entity-(A) in which such consumer signed the contract
sued upon; or (B) in which such consumer resides at the commencement
of the action.
Plaintiff Scott had applied for the credit card at the Lynchburg branch office
of CFB, however the suit was filed in Richmond, Virginia. This was neither
where the contract was signed, nor where the debtor currently resided; thus it
violated § 1692i(a) of the FDCPA. Scott, 964 F.2d at 316.
39. Scott, 964 F.2d at 316.
40. Id.
41. Id.
42. Id. See also 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6), which defines the term "debt collector"
to mean "any person who uses any instrumentality of interstate commerce or the
mails in any business the principal purpose of which is the collection of any
172 [Vol. 18:165
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unambiguous," the court refused to consider the legislative history
of the provision.43 Although the court acknowledged no absolute
rule against the use of extrinsic aids for statutory interpretation,
even when the statutory language on its face is unambiguous, it
further to give any weight to extrinsic aids presented from the
House comments on the amendment, the Banking Finance and
Urban Affairs Committee comments, or statements made by the
representative who sponsored the 1986 Amendments.44
Using the statutory definition the Scott court found the pri-
mary purpose of the attorney's business to be the collection of
debts, thus qualifying the attorney as a "debt collector" under the
Act.45 The attorney further argued that the court was bound by
the Federal Trade Commission ("FTC") interpretation of "debt col-
lector" under the FDCPA which does not include an attorney
whose practice is limited to legal activities.46 However, the court
declined to adopt the FTC position, deferring instead to the Act's
debts, or who regularly collects or attempts to collect, directly or indirectly, debts
owed -or due or asserted to be owed or due another."
43. Scott, 964 F.2d at 316. See United States v. Ron Pair Enter., Inc., 489
U.S. 235, 241 (1989) (quoting Cominetti v. United States, 242 U.S. 470 (1917)
which states that "[w]here the statute's language is plain and clear, the sole
function of the courts is 'to enforce it according to its terms").
44. Scott, 964 F.2d at 317. Extrinsic evidence presented included the House
of Representatives Report on the amendment, showing that the primary concern
of the Banking, Finance and Urban Affairs Committee was the unfair advantage
accorded to attorneys who could legally engage in the same abusive practices
that were proscribed for non-lawyer debt collectors. Id. (citing H.R. Rep. No.
405, supra note 8, at 1752). Additionally, defendant Jones quoted Rep.
Annunzio, speaking on the floor of the House after the passage of the bill, where
Annunzio stated that "[o]nly collection activities, not legal activities, are covered
by the Act. The Act applies to attorneys when they are collecting debts, not when
they are performing tasks of a legal nature." Id. (citing 132 Cong. Rec. H10031
(1986)). See also Train v. Colorado Pub. Interest Research Group, Inc., 426 U.S.
1, 10 (1976).
45. Scott, 964 F.2d at 317. Deposition testimony revealed that at least 70-
80% of defendant Jones' legal fees were generated in relation to legal work
performed toward the collection of debts. According to the court:
Jones regularly attempted to collect debts "indirectly," as outlined in the
second prong of the "debt collector" definition. The "regularity" is shown
by the sheer volume of Jones' business. Jones filed approximately 4,000
warrants per year between 1983 and 1987, and while the number
declined in recent years, the practice continued to constitute a
significant portion of his business. The filing of warrants constitutes an
"indirect" means of debt collection.
Id. at 316.
46. Id. at 317. The FTC's position had been that:
1996] 173
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plain statutory meaning, holding the attorney to be a "debt collec-
tor" under the Act subject to its venue provisions.4 7
The Ninth Circuit Court of Appeals reached a similar verdict
in Fox v. Citicorp Credit Serv., Inc.48 After the debtors defaulted
on a credit card account, the bank referred the matter to their col-
lection branch, which retained an attorney.49 On behalf of the
bank, the attorney filed an action against the debtors in Maricopa
County, Arizona.50 Before judgment was rendered, the two par-
ties reached an agreement stipulating that the debtors would pay
a specified sum every month until the debt was paid off.5 1 Subse-
quently, however, the debtors failed to pay off the debt according
to that agreement.5 2 The bank contacted the debtors numerous
times, threatening to garnish the debtors' wages if payment was
not forth coming. 53
After not receiving any payment from the debtors, the bank
contacted its attorney, requesting that he proceed with the gar-
nishment proceeding. 54 Before the attorney filed the action, the
debtors mailed the requested payment to the bank.5 5 The bank,
however, never informed the attorney of the current zero balance,
therefore the attorney proceeded with garnishment. 56 After the
garnishment proceeding had commenced, the attorney received
information showing the debtors to be current in their payments;
the attorney, thereafter quashed the writ of garnishment.5 7
Attorneys or law firms that engage in traditional debt collection
activities (sending dunning letters, making collection calls to
consumers) are covered by the FDCPA .... The term [debt collector]
does not include . . . [a]n attorney whose practice is limited to legal
activities (e.g., the filing and prosecution of lawsuits to reduce debts to
judgment).
Staff Commentary, supra note 28, at 50,100-02.
47. Scott, 964 F.2d at 317. See also Chevron, U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural
Resources Defense Council, Inc., 467 U.S. 837, 843 (1984) (holding that "if the
statute is silent or ambiguous with respect to the specific issue" a court should
defer to a reasonable administrative interpretation of the statute).
48. Fox v. Citicorp Credit Services, Inc., 15 F.3d 1507 (9th Cir. 1994).
49. Id. at 1510-11.
50. Id.
51. Id.
52. Id.
53. Fox, 15 F.3d at 1510-11.
54. Id.
55. Id.
56. Id. at 1511.
57. Id.
[Vol. 18:165
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Debtors then brought suit against the bank and the attorney
under the FDCPA. The attorney argued as an affirmative defense
that his actions Were covered by an implied exemption in the
FDCPA for attorneys engaged in legal actions.58
The district court granted summary judgment for the bank
and attorney.59 Reversing the decision, the Ninth Circuit Court
of Appeals refused to adopt "this 'phantom limb' theory of statu-
tory interpretation."6 0  The court instead deferred to the plain
meaning of the statute, and found no mention of an attorney
exemption, or any distinction between legal and non-legal
activities. 1
D. Heintz v. Jenkins: Resolving the FDCPA Applicability to
Attorneys
On April 18, 1995, the United States Supreme Court in
Heintz v. Jenkins held the FDCPA applicable to attorneys qualify-
ing under the Act's definition of "debt collector."62 The Court
accepted review of the Heintz case in order to clear the remaining
ambiguity among the districts since the 1986 Amendments to the
FDCPA were adopted.
In Jenkins v. Heintz, the debtor borrowed money from a bank
in order to buy a car. After the debtor defaulted on her loan, the
58. Id. at 1512. See Firemen's Ins. Co. v. Keating, 753 F. Supp. 1137, 1141-44
(S.D.N.Y. 1990); National Union Fire Ins. Co. v. Hartel, 741 F. Supp. 1139, 1140-
41 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). See also Green v. Hocking, 792 F. Supp. 1064, 1065-66 (E.D.
Mich. 1992). These cases conclude that Congress did not intend to expose "those
attorneys acting in the role of legal counsel while representing clients" to FDCPA
liability.
59. Fox, 15 F.3d at 1512.
60. Id.
61. Id. "Applying our general rules of statutory construction to the FDCPA
freed from the repealed limitation, neither the plain language of the Act nor its
structure supports any exemption for attorneys' 'purely legal' debt collection
activities." Id. Additionally, looking to the legislative history of the 1986 repeal
of the attorney exemption, the Fox court found no clearly-expressed contrary
intention necessary to overcome "the strong presumption that Congress
expresses its intent through the language it chooses." Id. (quoting INS v.
Cardoza-Fonseca, 480 U.S. 421 (1987)). See Sacramento Regional County
Sanitation Dist. v. Reilly, 905 F.2d 1262, 1268 (9th Cir. 1990) (stating "[tihe plain
language of a statute is the starting point of statutory construction."); Seldovia
Native Ass'n. v. Lujan, 904 F.2d 1335, 1341 (9th Cir. 1990) (holding that to
determine plain meaning the court must look to language and design of statute
as whole).
62. Heintz v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 1489 (1995).
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bank retained a law firm to proceed with litigation in order to col-
lect the debt. 3 The defendant, an attorney and partner with the
retained law firm, sued the debtor in state court to recover the
balance due on the loan.64 In an effort to settle the suit, the attor-
ney wrote a letter to the debtor detailing the amount of debt owed
to the Bank.6 5 Included as part of the amount of debt was a sum
for insurance bought by the bank because the debtor had not kept
the car insured as her loan agreement required.66 Subsequently,
the debtor brought a FDCPA suit against the attorney and his
firm claiming the letter violated the Act's prohibitions against
attempting to collect an amount not "authorized by the agreement
creating the debt."67
Plaintiff-debtor conceded the agreement required her to keep
the car insured "against loss or damage" and- permitted the bank
to buy such insurance to protect the car should she fail to do so.68
However, the plaintiff-debtor claimed the substitute policy was
not the kind of policy the loan agreement had in mind for it
insured the bank not only against "loss or damage" but also
against her failure to repay the bank's car loan.6 9  Therefore a
portion of the debt owed to the bank was not authorized by the
original contract.7" Since the attorney's representation about the
debt amount was false, the defendant-attorney had attempted to
collect an "amount" not authorized" by the loan agreement, thus
violating the FDCPA.7 '
The District Court dismissed the suit, holding the FDCPA not
applicable to lawyers engaged in litigation.72 Reversing, the Sev-
enth Circuit Court of Appeals interpreted the Act to apply to liti-
gating lawyers.73
The Supreme Court granted certiorari thereby affirming the
decision of the Court of Appeals. In an opinion by Justice Breyer,
63. Id. at 1492. The Court determined the bank was a client of the law firm
and has a large number of customers who sign retail installment contracts for
the purchase of motor vehicles. Id.
64. Id. at 1493.
65. Id.
66. Id.
67. Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A).
68. Heintz, 115 S. Ct. at 1493.
69. Id. at 1495.
70. Id.
71. Id.
72. Id.
73. Jenkins v. Heintz, 25 F.3d 536 (7th Cir. 1994).
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expressing the unanimous view of the court, the Court held that
the FDCPA applies to attorneys who regularly engage in con-
sumer debt collection practices through litigation. 4
The Court cited two reasons for the holding. First, the
FDCPA defines "debt collector" to include those who "regularly
collec[t] or attemp[t] to collect, directly or indirectly, [consumer]
debts owed or due or asserted to be owed or due another."75 Thus,
attorneys who regularly strive to obtain payment of consumer
debts through legal proceedings, qualify as debt collectors pursu-
ant to the statutory definition.76
Second, the original version of the FDCPA did contain an
express exemption for attorneys which stated that the term "debt
collector" did not include "any attorney-at-law collecting a debt as
an attorney on behalf of or in the name of a client."77 However,
the 1986 Amendments to the FDCPA completely eliminated this
exemption without enacting a narrower litigation exemption for
attorneys.78
The Court further rejected all arguments for reading the Act
as containing an implied exemption for attorneys engaging in debt
collection activities. 79 Petitioner-attorney introduced statements
by one of the sponsors of the amendment, taken after the Amend-
ment was adopted:
[The Act] regulates debt collection, not the practice of law. Con-
gress repealed the attorney exemption to the act, not because of
74. Heintz, 115 S. Ct. at 1492.
75. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6).
76. Heintz, 115 S. Ct. at 1495. Black's Law Dictionary defines "collect" as
"[t]o collect a debt or claim is to obtain payment or liquidation of it, either by
personal solicitation or legal proceedings" BLAci's LAw DICTIONARY 263 (6th ed.
1990).
77. Pub. L. No. 95-109, § 803(6)(F), 91 Stat. 874, 875. In 1986 Congress
repealed this exception in its entirety without creating a narrower, litigation-
related exemption to fill the void. Pub. L. No. 99-361, 100 Stat. 768.
78. See 1986 Amendments supra note 10.
79. Heintz, 115 S. Ct. at 1491. Arguments presented by the attorney in favor
of reading an implied litigation exception are: 1) That application of the Act's
requirements to litigation activities will create harmfully anomalous results not
intended by Congress; 2) that after the amendment became law, a statement was
made, by one of the sponsors of the 1986 Amendment, Congressman Frank
Annunzio, that removed the exemption, to the effect that the Act covered only the
collection of debt, not the practice of law; and 3) that a Federal Trade
Commission Staff Commentary indicated that attorneys who engage in
traditional debt collection activities are covered by the Act but those whose
practice is limited to legal activities are not covered.
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attorneys' conduct in the courtroom, but because of their conduct
in the back room. Only collection activities, not legal activities,
are covered by the act .... The act applies to attorneys when they
are collecting debts, not when they are performing tasks of a legal
nature... . The act only regulates the conduct of debt collectors, it
does not prevent creditors, through their attorneys, from pursuing
any legal remedies available to them.8
0
The Court found this unpersuasive because the Congressmen
made his statement "not during the legislative process, but after
the statute became law. It therefore is not a statement upon
which other legislators might have relied in voting for or against
the Act .. .s.81
Petitioner-attorney also introduced "Commentary" on the Act
by the Federal Trade Commission which stated the existence of an
implied exemption from the Act for litigating attorneys.8 2 The
Court refused to give the comments conclusive weight, finding
nothing in the Act or elsewhere indicating that Congress intended
to authorize the FTC to create an exception from the Act's cover-
age, especially an exception that lies outside the range of reason-
able interpretations of the Act's express language.8 3
III. AFTERMATH OF HEINTZ
What exactly does all this mean? Now that Heintz clearly
provides that there is no longer an attorney or litigation exemp-
tion to the FDCPA, how will this affect the attorney practitioner in
the future? Simply stated, attorneys who meet the statutory defi-
nition of "debt collector" and thereby attempt to collect a "debt" as
defined by the Act, subject themselves to liability for any violation
of the Act's provisions.
80. 132 Cong. Rec. 30842 (1986).
81. Heintz, 115 S. Ct. at 1497.
82. Staff Commentary, supra note 28, at 50100 (stating "[aittorneys or law
firms that engage in traditional debt collection activities (sending dunning
letters, making collection calls to consumers) are covered by the [Act]. But those
whose practice is limited to legal activities are not covered").
83. See also Fox v. Citicorp Credit Serv., Inc., 15 F.3d 1507, 1513 (9th Cir.
1994); Scott v. Jones, 964 F.2d 314, 317 (4th Cir. 1992) (finding FTC staff's
statement conflicts with the Act's plain language and is therefore not entitled to
deference).
[Vol. 18:165
14
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss1/4
FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES
A. What is a "Debt" Under the FDCPA?
The Act as it currently stands applies only to the traditional
collection of "consumer debts."84 Section 1692a(3) of the FDCPA
defines "consumer" as follows: "any natural person obligated or
allegedly obligated to pay any debt."8 5 Further, the Act defines
the term "debt" to mean:
[A]ny obligation or alleged obligation of a consumer to pay
money arising out of a transaction in which the money, property,
insurance, or services which are the subject of the transaction are
primarily for personal, family, or household purposes, whether or
not such obligation has been reduced to judgment.8 6
Under the statutory defininition of "debt," the borrower's use of
the proceeds is paramount, whereas the lender's motive or intent
is irrelevant.8 7
From these definitions, courts determine whether the dis-
puted debt falls within the statutory definition of "debt," thereby
requiring the debt collector to comply with the FDCPA.s8 This
distinction, however, is not always so clear. Many debts fall
outside the statutory definition, thus not requiring debt collectors
to comply with the Act.
For example, a debt incurred purely for business reasons does
not qualify as a debt under the FDCPA. 9 The court in Bloom v.
84. For general legislative purposes see generally 15 U.S.C. § 1692a and 1977
U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695.
85. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(3).
86. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). See also Zimmerman v. HBO Affiliate Group, 834
F.2d 1163, 1168-69 (3d Cir. 1987) (defining consumer debt under the FDCPA to
be a transaction in which a consumer is offered or extended the right to acquire
"money, property, insurance, or services" which are "primarily for household
purposes" and to "defer payment").
87. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).
88. See Herbert v. Monterey Financial Serv., Inc., 863 F. Supp. 76, 79 (D.
Conn. 1994). (holding a debt arising out of a transaction involving vacation time-
share for the debtor and her family was for personal or family purposes, thus
within the statutory definition of "debt" in the FDCPA); Scrimpsher v.
Scrimpsher, 17 B.R. 999 (Bkrpt. N.D.N.Y. 1982). In Scrimpsher, the debtor's
"debt" arose from several purchases of food paid for by personal checks. The
court found that the collection bureau's activities concerning collection of the
debtor's outstanding dishonored checks involved collection of a "debt" under this
subchapter, despite argument that dishonored checks represented debts separate
and distinct from debt associated with debtor's consumer purchase of food. Id.
89. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5). See also Bank of Boston Intern. of Miami v.
Arguello Tefel, 644 F. Supp. 1423 (E.D.N.Y. 1986) (finding the debt involved was
a business debt and therefore not subject to the FDCPA); Mendez v. Apple Bank
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IC. Sys. Inc., held loans made between friends, so that the debtor
could invest in a software company, were "business loans," not
"consumer debt," because the debtor's intended use of the funds
could not be characterized as "primarily for personal, family or
household purposes."90
Child support obligations arising from administrative support
orders do not qualify as a "debt" under the Act because they are
not incurred in exchange for goods or services. For example, in
Mabe v. G.C. Serv. Ltd. Partnership, the Third Circuit Court of
Appeals determined that the Department of Social Services had
imposed child support obligations upon appellants to force them to
fulfill their parental duty to support their children.9 Therefore,
the child support arrearage was not a consumer "debt" as defined
by the FDCPA.92
Additionally, capital taxes levied by local governments are not
subject to the FDCPA. In Staub v. Harris, the 3rd Circuit held a
per capita tax levied by local taxing authorities not to be a debt
under the FDCPA; at a minimum, the debt must arise as a result
of the rendition of a service or the purchase of property or any
other items of value.93
B. What is a 'Debt Collector" Under the FDCPA?
Once it has been determined that the debt in question falls
under the FDCPA, a person collecting the debt must meet the
statutory definition of "debt collector" in order to subject himself to
for Sav., 541 N.Y.S.2d 920 (N.Y. 1989) (finding the debt involved was a business
debt and therefore not subject to the FDCPA).
90. 753 F. Supp. 314, 317 (1990), aff'd, 972 F.2d 1067 (9th Cir. 1992). Other
Courts have reached the same conclusion that the FDCPA does not apply where
an examination of the transaction as a whole, and the purpose for which credit
was extended shows that the loan was primarily a business loan. See Poe v. First
Nat'l Bank of Dekalb County, 597 F.2d 895, 896 (5th Cir. 1979); Morse v. Mutual
Fed. Sav. & Loan Ass'n of Whitman, 536 F. Supp. 1271, 1275-78 (D. Mass. 1982).
Agricultural loans are generally not considered "debt" as defined by the
FDCPA. See Munk v. Federal Land Bank of Wichita, 791 F.2d 130 (10th Cir.
1986) (holding loans for agricultural purposes were not incurred for personal,
family or household purposes, therefore lenders were not attempting to collect
another's debt, thus the Federal Fair Debt Collection Practices Act did not apply
to the transaction); 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(5).
91. 32 F.3d 86, 88 (3d Cir. 1994).
92. Id.
93. 626 F.2d 275, 277-78 (3d Cir. 1980). The relationship between taxpayer
and taxing authority does not encompass that type of pro tanto exchange which
the statutory definition envisages.
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the provisions of the Act. Section 1692a(6) of the FDCPA defines
"debt collector" as:
[A]ny person who uses any instrumentality of interstate com-
merce or the mails in any business the principal purpose of which
is the collection of any debts, or who regularly collects or attempts
to collect, directly or indirectly, debts owed or due or asserted to be
owed or due another. 94
The FDCPA generally does not apply to creditors collecting or
attempting to collect their own debts. However, the Act specifi-
cally includes as a debt collector "any creditor who, in the process
of collecting his own debts, uses any name other than his own
which would indicate that a third person is collecting or attempt-
ing to collect such debts."95 Thus, any employee of a creditor who
represents to a debtor that he or she is working independently, or
for a third party, subjects the original creditor to the Act as a "debt
collector."96
Similarly, in-house counsel normally exempt from the Act can
lose their exempt status if, in communicating with creditors con-
cerning the collection of any debt, they leave the impression that
they have been retained as counsel independent and separate
from the entity to which the debt is owed.9 Additionally, a "cred-
94. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6). "
95. Id.
96. Kempf v. Famous Barr Co., 676 F. Supp. 937, 938 (E.D. Mo. 1988). Even
though the employee of the creditor regularly collects debts owed to another (i.e.,
her employer/creditor), the employee is not a "debt collector" so long as the
employee acts "in the name of the creditor" by informing the debtor that she is
collecting the debt as an employee of the creditor. Id. See Kicken v. Valentine
Prod. Credit Ass'n., 628 F. Supp. 1008, 1011 (D. Neb. 1984); Dau v. Storm Lake
Production Credit Ass'n., 626 F. Supp. 862, 864 (N.D. Iowa 1985); West v.
Costen, 558 F. Supp. 564, 573 (W.D. Va. 1983); 1977 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1695, 1698
(stating "[tihe term debt collector is not intended to include . . . 'in house'
collectors for creditorsso long as they use the creditor's true business name when
collecting").
If the employee of the creditor is collecting the debt on behalf of the
creditorm, and indicates to the debtor that she is collecting the debt as an
employee of a third person, then the creditor is a "debt collector." Similarly, if
the employee of the creditor denies that she is collecting the debt as an employee
of the creditor, then the employee is a "debt collector" because the employee
collects debts owed to a third party, but does not act "in the name of the creditor."
Kempf, 676 F. Supp. at 938.
97. See Dorsey v. Morgan, 760 F. Supp. 509, 513-14 (D. Md. 1991). In Dorsey,
the letterhead of the attorney's letter to the consumer referred only to the
attorney, and further contained no references to the creditor, but the letter
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itor" who is also an "assignee" is thereby subject to the Act's
provisions. 98
The Act further lists collectors specifically excluded from the
statutory definition of "debt collector."99 Included in this list are
any officer or employee of a creditor acting in the name of the cred-
itor and trying to collect a debt for such creditor, and any person
who acts as a debt collector for another person if: 1) both are
related by common ownership or affiliated corporate control, and
2) the person collecting the debt does so only for persons to whom
he is related to and the principal business of that person is not the
collection of debts.10 0 Additional exemptions from the definition of
referred to the creditor as a "client" and did not indicate an attempt to collect in
the seller's name. Id.
98. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(4). "Creditor" means any person who offers or
extends credit creating a debt or to whom a debt is owed, but such term does not
include any person to the extent that he receives an assignment or transfer of a
debt in default solely for the purpose of facilitating collection of such debt for
another. Id.; See also Meads v. Citicorp Credit Serv., Inc., 686 F. Supp. 330, 333
(S.D. Ga. 1988). In Meads the court held creditors were generally not considered
to be "debt collectors" subject to the Act unless the debt collector is also the
assignee of the debt. Id.
99. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(A)-(F). Section 1692a(6) states:
The term does not include:
(A) any officer or employee of a creditor while, in the name of the
creditor, collecting debts for such creditor;
(B) any person while acting as a debt collector for another person, both
of whom are related by common ownership or affiliated by corporate
control, if the person acting as a debt collector does so only for persons to
whom it is so related or affiliated and if the principal business of such
person is not the collection of debts;
(C) any officer or employee of the United States or any State to the
extent that collecting or attempting to collect any debt is in the
performance of his official duties;
(D) any person while serving or attempting to serve legal process on any
other person in connection with the judicial enforcement of any debt;
(E) any nonprofit organization which, at the request of consumers,
performs bona fide consumer credit counseling and assists consumers in
the liquidation of their debts by receiving payments from such
consumers and distributing such amounts to creditor; and
(F) any person collecting or attempting to collect any debt owed or due
or asserted to be owed or due another to the extent such activity (i) is
incidental to a bona fide fiduciary obligation or a bona fide escrow
arrangement; (ii) concerns a debt which was originated by such person;
(iii) concerns a debt which was not in default at the time it was obtained
by such person; or (iv) concerns a debt obtained by such person as a
secured party in" a commercial credit transaction involving the creditor.
100. Section 1692a(A)-(B).
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"debt collector" provided by the statute concern certain fiduciary
relationships. 11
The Heintz case qualified the present law concerning the
FDCPA applicability to attorneys by holding an attorney who
qualifies as a "debt collector" under the statutory definition, must
conform to the Act's provisions.10 2 Ambiguity remains, however,
concerning in which situations an attorney qualifies as a "debt col-
lector" under the statutory defintion.
Those courts which previously held that there was no longer
an attorney exemption to the FDCPA still had to determine
whether the attorney in question met the statutory definition of
"debt collector." In Crossley v. Liberman, the court directly
addressed this issue holding that the trier of fact must determine
on a case by case basis whether an attorney has regularly col-
lected or attempted to collect a debt. 103 However, the term "regu-
larly" is not synonymous with "substantial."'0 4 Therefore, a law
firm can regularly collect debts even though those services amount
to only a small fraction of the firm's total activities. 105
101. Section 1692a(C)-(F).
102. See Heintz v. Jenkins, 115 S. Ct. 1489 (1995).
103. Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F. 2d 566 (3d Cir. 1989). In Crossley, the court
held that the attorney was a "debt collector" subject to the requirements of the
Fair Debt Collection Practices Act and was not a mere agent where the collection
letters the attorney sent to debtors unequivocally stated that monies were to be
sent to him directly. Id. Factors the trier of fact should consider in determining
whether an attorney has regularly collected a debt include the volume and
nature of the attorney's case load. Id.
104. Although the FDCPA fails to define "regularly," Black's Law Dictionary
defines "regular" to mean "steady or uniform in course, practice, or occurrence;
not subject to unexplained or irrational variation. Usual, customary, normal or
general." BLACieS LAw DIcTIONARY 1285 (6th ed. 1990).
105. Stojanovski v. Strobl & Manoogian, P.C., 783 F. Supp. 319, 322 (E.D. Mi.
1992). In Stojanovski the attorney's practice was sufficiently high to constitute
"regular" debt collection. Id. The defendant attorney had an ongoing
relationship with Chrysler, a large corporation with presumably many overdue
accounts on its books. Id. While the ratio of debt collection to other efforts was
small, the actual volume was sufficient to bring the defendant under the Act's
definition of "debt collector." Id. See also Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566,
569 (3d Cir. 1989). In Crossley, the court held the case law on point shows that
an attorney "who engages in collection activities more than a handful of times
per year must comply with the Act." Id. It is the volume of the attorney's debt
collection efforts that is dispositive, not the percentage such efforts amount to in
the attorney's practice. Id. See also Cacace v. Lucas, 775 F. Supp. 502, 504 (D.
Conn. 1990); In re Littles, 90 B.R. 669, 676 (Bankr. E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd as
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Some courts in determining whether an attorney has "regu-
larly attempted to collect a debt" have considered the percentage
of total practice devoted to debt collection. In Fox. v. Citicorp
Credit Serv., Inc., the court held that an attorney who dedicated
80% of his practice to debt collection fell within the definition of
"debt collector" under FDCPA. 10 6  Similarly, where a bank
retained an attorney to represent the bank for lawsuits based on
delinquent credit card accounts, the attorney was found to be a
"debt collector" under the FDCPA since at least 70% of the attor-
ney's legal fees were generated from debt collection; the "principal
purpose" of the attorney's practice was filing warrants which con-
stituted an "indirect" means of debt collection. 10 7
Other courts have found attorneys to be "debt collectors"
under the FDCPA, even though the portion of their business dedi-
cated to debt collection is considerably less than fifty percent. A
Michigan federal district court held that a law firm, which had an
ongoing relationship with a corporate client with numerous over-
due accounts, qualified as a person who "regularly" collected debts
for FDCPA purposes, even though the firm's collection business
consituted less than four percent of its total business.' 08 Simi-
larly, the federal district court for Connecticut, in Cacace v. Lucas,
found an attorney qualified as a "debt collector" within the mean-
ing of the FDCPA, even though debt collection did not form a prin-
cipal part of the attorney's practice.'0 9 In that case, the attorney
modified sub nom., Crossley v. Lieberman, 90 B.R. 682 (E.D. Pa. 1988), aff'd, 868:
F.2d 566 (3d Cir. 1989).
106. 15 F.3d 1507 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding that even though the filing of an
application for writ of garnishment by the attorney was a pure legal action, this
did not alter the conclusion because the attorney exemption was no longer part of
FDCPA).
107. Scott v. Jones, 964 F.2d 314 (4th Cir. 1992). See also Cirkot v. Diversified
Fin. Sys., Inc., 839 F. Supp. 941 (D. Conn. 1993). The court held the general
partner of a partnership engaged primarily in the business of providing collection
services for the partnership and third parties was a "debt collector" for purposes
of Fair Debt Collection Practices Act.
108. Stojanovski, 783 F. Supp. at 322.
109. 775 F. Supp. 502, 505 (D. Conn. 1990). The court held that debt collection
does not form a principal part of the defendant's practice. Instead, a person can
be a person who regularly collects debts owed or due another within the meaning
of the FDCPA based on the regularity of the defendant's involvement in debt
collection work, and the amount of debt collection work the defendant engaged in
at the time in question. See also Crossley, 868 F.2d at 570. In Crossley, the court
found that in order to determine whether an attorney is a person who "regularly"
collects a debt, the court may take into account the volume of the attorney's
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filed one hundred and forty-four small claims suits concerning col-
lection matters in 1986 and 1987.110
Finally, where an attorney, in his representation of a creditor
in debt collection efforts, does not send a demand letter to debtors,
but merely accommodates debtors by providing them with infor-
mation they request, does not thereby qualify as a "debt collector"
subject to the Act."1
IV. APPLICABLE SECTIONS OF THE FDCPA THAT ATTORNEYS
NEED BEWARE
Attorneys who qualify as "debt collectors" under the Act and
thereby attempt to collect a consumer debt, should beware of the
general requirements of the FDCPA in order to avoid potential lia-
bility. These requirments fall within several categories: 1) venue;
2) disclosure requirements; 3) communications with the debtor; 4)
communications with third-parties; and 5) civil liability.
A. Venue Provisions Under the FDCPA
The venue provisions of the FDCPA were designed to limit a
debt collector's ability to file debt collection actions in courts
inconvenient to a consumer debtor." 2 Section 1692i of the
FDCPA provides that a debt collector may sue a consumer debtor
only in the judicial district, or similar legal entity, where the con-
collection activities, the frequency of the use of the collection letter in question,
and whether or not there is an ongoing relationship between the attorney and
the collection agency he represents.
110. Cacace, 775 F. Supp. at 505. The collection letter in question had been
used 125-150 times in fourteen months, and more than 60% of the attorney's
work for the credit union involved collection matters.
111. Williams v. Trott, 822 F. Supp. 1266, 1269 (E.D. Mich. 1993). In
Williams, the attorney, at the request of the debtor, provided the debtor with
information concerning the reinstatement of the debtor's mortgage in order to
avoid foreclosure. The contact the attorney had with the plaintiffs was not for
the purpose of collecting the debt but merely to accommodate the plaintiffs by
providing information they requested regarding reinstatement of the mortgage
to avoid foreclosure. Id. Se also Firemen's Ins. Co. of Newark v. Keating, 753 F.
Supp. 1137 (S.D.N.Y. 1990). The court in Keating held a law firm not to be a
"debt collector," as defined by Fair Debt Collection Practice Act, with respect to
its representation of a surety in actions brought by the surety to compel
partnership investors, who were in default on promissory notes, to comply with
indemnification agreements.
112. S. Rep. No. 382 supra note 7 at 1699; Dutton v. Wolhar, 809 F. Supp.
1130, 1139 (D. Del. 1992); Action Professional Serv. v. Kiggins, 458 N.W.2d 365,
367 (S.D. 1990).
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sumer originally signed the contract sued upon, or where the con-
sumer resides at the commencement of the action. 113 If services
are provided pursuant to an oral agreement, the debt collector
may sue only where the consumer currently resides.11 4
However, once a judgment is obtained in a forum that satis-
fies the Act's requirements, it may be enforced in other jurisdic-
tions since the consumer had the opportunity to defend the
original action previously in a convenient forum. 1 15 Finally, any
waiver of the venue provisions provided in the FDCPA must be
addressed directly to the debt collector. 11
6
B. Validation of Debt and Disclosure Requirements Under the
FDCPA
Within five days after his initial communication with a con-
sumer debtor, a debt collector must send a written validation
notice which contains the following: 1) the amount of the debt; 2)
113. 15 U.S.C. § 1692i. Section 1692i states:
Legal actions by debt collectors-
(a) Venue. Any debt collector who brings any legal action on a debt
against any consumer shall-
(1) in the case of an action to enforce an interest in real property
securing the consumer's obligation, bring such action only in a
judicial district or similar legal entity in which such real property is
located; or
(2) in the case of an action not described in paragraph (1), bring
such action only in the judicial district or similar legal entity-
(A) in which such consumer signed the contract sued upon; or
(B) in which such consumer resides at the commencement of
the action.
(b) Authorization of actions. Nothing in this title shall be construed to
authorize the bringing of legal actions by debt collectors.
114. See Staff Commentary, supra note 28, at 50101. See also Fox v. Citicorp
Credit Serv., Inc., 15 F.3d 1507, 1513 (9th Cir. 1994). The complaint in Fox
alleged that the defendants violated the venue provisions by filing the two
actions in Maricopa County, which was neither where the plaintiffs resided nor
where they signed the contract. However, the plaintiffs were unable to argue
this point because the statute of limitations had run out.
115. Staff Commentary, supra note 28, at 50109. See also 15 U.S.C.
§ 1692k(d). Section 1692k(d) states:
Jurisdiction-An action to enforce any liability created by this
subchapter may be brought in any appropriate United States district
court without regard to the amount in controversy, or in any other court
of competent jurisdiction, within oNE YEAR from the date on which the
violation occurs.
(Emphasis added).
116. Staff Commentary, supra note 28, at 50109.
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the creditor's name; 3) a statement that unless the consumer dis-
putes the debt within thirty days after receipt of such notice, the
debt will be assumed valid by the debt collector; 4) a statement
that if the consumer does notify the debt collector in writing
within thirty days of receipt of such notice, the debt collector will
obtain verification of the debt, or a copy of any judgment, and that
a copy of the verification will be mailed to the consumer by the
debt collector; and 5) a statement that upon written request by the
consumer within thirty days of receipt of such notice, the debt col-
lector will provide the consumer with the name and address of the
original creditor, if different from the current debt collector. 11 7
In order to give sufficient notice to the debtor, the disclosures
required on the notice of debt must be situated so they can be eas-
ily read, and prominent enough to be noticed by even the "least
sophisticated" debtor.118 The notice must not be "overshadowed
117. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(a)(1)-(5). The disclosures required in subsection g may
be given as part of the initial communication to the debtor providing they are in
writing; if not in writing they must be sent to the debtor within five days of the
initial communications. Id. See also Pipiles v. Credit Bureau of Lockport, 886
F.2d 22, 26-27 (2d Cir. 1989) (confirming the notice requirement is mandatory);
Emanuel v. American Credit Exch., 870 F.2d 805, 808 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding the
failure to include such a notice is a basis for the granting of summary judgment);
Raymond Woolfolk v. Albert G. Rubin, 783 F. Supp. 724 (D. Conn. 1990); Ayala v.
Dial Adjustment Bureau, Inc., Civil No. N-86-315 (EEB) (D. Conn. Dec 4, 1986);
Manuel H. Newburger, Acceleration Notices and Demand Letters, 47 CONSUMER
FiN. L. Q. REP. 338 (1993). (discussing a detailed accounting of the specific
categories under the FDCPA).
118. Wright v. Credit Bureau of Georgia, Inc., 555 F. Supp. 1005, 1007 (N.D.
Ga. 1982) (deciding that the test developed under the Federal Trade Commission
Act cases, which looked not to the most, but to the "least sophisticated" readers,
was more appropriate than the less stringent "reasonable consumer" test
developed from the Truth in Lending Act). See also Bustamante v. First Fed.
Sav. & Loan Ass'n, 619 F.2d 360, 364 (5th Cir.1980) (considering the term
"reasonable consumer" an appropriate appellation for the objective standard to
be applied, providing that standard encompasses protection for "the
unsophisticated or uneducated consumer"); Exposition Press, Inc. v. FTC, 295
F.2d 869, 871-73 (2d Cir. 1961) (finding section 1692e violated if "debtors on the
low side of reasonable capacity who read a given notice or hear a given statement
read into the message oppressiveness, falsehood or threat"); Dutton v. Wolhar,
809 F. Supp. 1130, 1141 (1992) (analyzing a claim under section 1692e(10) by
using the least sophisticated debtor standard and finding that "when language is
susceptible to two plausible interpretations the least sophisticated debtor is not
charged with gleaning the more subtle of the two interpretations"); Bingham v.
Collection Bureau, Inc., 505 F. Supp. 864, 870 (D.N.D. 1981) (holding that to
determine whether a statement by a debt collector is false, deceptive, or
23
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or contradicted" by any other messages appearing in the
communication. 119
If a consumer notifies the debt collector in writing within
thirty days of the verification notice that the debt is disputed, the
debt collector must cease collection of the debt.'20 The debt collec-
tor may not continue collection of the debt until he receives either
verification or a copy of the judgement, and it is mailed to the con-
sumer by the debt collector. 12 ' Regardless of whether the debt is
disputed, this notice requirement does not prohibit attorneys from
engaging in any legal action regarding the debt within the thirty
day period of sending the validation notice.'22
C. Communications Covered by the FDCPA
The FDCPA strictly regulates all "communications" between
a debt collector and a consumer or third party regarding the col-
lection of any debt. "Communications" under the FDCPA means
"the conveying of information regarding a debt directly or indi-
rectly to any person through any medium."123
1. Communications to Debtors
A debt collector may not communicate directly with the con-
sumer at any unusual time, place, or at a time or place which
misleading, the court "should look not to the most sophisticated readers but to
the least").
119. Swanson v. Southern Oregon Credit Serv., Inc., 869 F.2d 1222, 1225 (9th
Cir. 1988). Two other circuits have adopted the Ninth circuits ruling preventing
the 30 day notice letter from having any other communication overshadowing or
contradicting the disclosures. See Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107, 109-111
(3d Cir. 1991). In Graziano, an attorney gave the 30 day notice, but also
threatened to sue within ten days. Id. The court held that the inclusion of a
threat to sue within ten days "overshadowed" and "contradicted" the 30 day
language in the validation notice. Id. However, the phrase at the bottom of the
page which said "See reverse side for information regarding your legal rights!",
was a statement of rights printed in a manner sufficient to bring it to the
attention of the debtor. Id. In Miller v. Payco-General Am. Credits, Inc., 943
F.2d 482 (4th Cir. 1991), the court determined that the words "IMMEDIATE
FULL PAYMENT," "PHONE US TODAY," and "NOW" in bold face type printed
on the 30 day validation notice "overshadowed" and "contradicted" the validation
notice. Id. See also Manuel H. Newburger, Acceleration Notices and Demand
Letters, 47 CONSUMER FIN. L. Q. REP. 338 (1993).
120. 15 U.S.C. § 1692g(b).
121. Id.
122. See Staff Commentary, supra note 28, at 50101.
123. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(2).
188 [Vol. 18:165
24
Campbell Law Review, Vol. 18, Iss. 1 [1996], Art. 4
http://scholarship.law.campbell.edu/clr/vol18/iss1/4
FAIR DEBT COLLECTION PRACTICES
should be known to be inconvenient to the consumer, without first
obtaining prior permission from the consumer.124 The FDCPA
further requires any communication sent by a "debt collector" to
state clearly that the "debt collector is attempting to collect a debt
and any information obtained will be used for that purpose."125
Some dispute remains whether this requirement applies to follow-
up letters sent by the debt collector after the initial notice. Some
circuits have held such follow up communications do not require
this disclosure requirement. 126 Most circuits, however, maintain
that follow-up letters sent to the creditor after the initial commu-
nication fall under the statutory definition of "communication,"
thus requiring compliance with the Act. 27 This forces a debt col-
124. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c. Section 1692c states:
Communication in connection with debt collection:
(a) Communication with the consumer generally-Without the prior
consent of the consumer given directly to the debt collector or the
express permission of a court of competent jurisdiction, a debt collector
may not communicate with a consumer in connection with the collection
of any debt-
(1) at any unusual time or place or a time or place known or which
should be known to be inconvenient to the consumer. In the
absence of knowledge of circumstances to the contrary, a debt
collector shall assume that the convenient time for communicating
with a consumer is after 8 o'clock antimeridian and before 9 o'clock
postmeridian, local time at the consumer's location;
(2) if the debt collector knows the consumer is represented by an
attorney with respect to such debt and has knowledge of, or can
readily ascertain, such attorney's name and address, unless the
attorney fails to respond within a reasonable period of time to a
communication from the debt collector or unless the attorney
consents to direct communication with the consumer; or
(3) at the consumer's place of employment if the debt collector
knows or has reason to know that the consumer's employer
prohibits the consumer from receiving such communication.
125. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11). An exception to this requirement is available for a
debt collector who is attempting to acquire location information about a
consumer under section 1692b.
126. Pressly v. Capital Credit & Collection Serv. Inc., 760 F.2d 922, 925 (9th
Cir. 1985) (holding "that the follow up notice sent in this case is not a
'communication' within which the disclosure required by 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11)
was made").
127. See Tolentino v. Friedman, 46 F.3d 645, 650-52 (7th Cir. 1995). In
Tolentino, the defendant, an attorney collecting debts on behalf of a bank, filed a
lawsuit to collect a debt owed the bank after no reply was received from a
dunning letter sent. Id. The communication in question was a follow up letter
mailed to the debtor after the initial dunning letter. Id. This letter, entitled
"IMPORTANT NOTICE" did not contain the warning required by subsection
1996] 189
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lector to include in any communication to the consumer, whether
it is the initial dunning letter, or a subsequent follow-up letter,
the statements required under the Act concerning the debt collec-
tor's intention to collect a debt.12 Failure to include this disclo-
sure is a "false, deceptive, or misleading representation" in
connection with debt collection.
129
Where the debt collector knows that the consumer is repre-
sented by an attorney regarding the debt, the debt collector may
not communicate directly with the consumer, but may communi-
cate only through the retained attorney. 130 There are, however,
two exceptions to this rule. A debt collector may contact the con-
sumer directly when: 1) the consumer's retained attorney fails to
respond in a reasonable time to the debt collector's communica-
tion, or 2) the retained attorney's address or location is not read-
ily obtainable. 131
In communicating with the consumer debtor, under no cir-
cumstances may a debt collector imply threats, or engage in any
communication to harass, oppress, or abuse any person in connec-
(11). Id. The court held that the defendant violated subsection (11) of the
FDCPA, in that subsection (11) applies to "all communications made to collect a
debt." The FDCPA defines "communication" as "the conveying of information
regarding a debt directly or indirectly to any person through any medium." 15
U.S.C. § 1692a(2). Defendant's "IMPORTANT NOTICE," obviously related to
the debt, and nevertheless he failed to write on the "IMPORTANT NOTICE"
that he was attempting to collect a debt and that any information would be used
for that purpose. Id. See Carroll v. Wolpoff& Abramson, 961 F.2d 459, 461 (4th
Cir. 1992). In Carroll, the Fourth Circuit stated the language "all
communications" in section 1692e(11) was clear and unambiguous, making no
distinction between initial and subsequent communications. Id. Consumers
sometimes did not receive first notices, thus follow-up letters often provide them
with their first notice of the debt collection process. Id. Therefore, the disclosure
requirements of Section 1692e(11) in the follow-up letters further Congressional
intent to prevent abusive debt collection techniquies. Id. See Pipiles v. Credit
Bureau of Lockport, 886 F.2d 22, 26-27 (2d Cir. 1989) (holding that the balancing
analysis applied in Pressley is precluded by clear statutory language). See also
Dutton v. Wolpoff & Abramson, 5 F.3d 649 (3d Cir. 1993) and Frey v. Gangwish
II, 970 F.2d 1516 (6th Cir. 1992) (both rejecting Pressley and following the
Second Circuit); Johnson v. Eaten, 873 F. Supp. 1019, 1027 (1995) (rejecting
Pressley and holding that all communications met the disclosure requirement).
128. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(11).
129. 15 U.S.C. § 1692e.
130. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a).
131. 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(2).
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tion with a debt. 132  For instance a debt collector may not use
violence, obscenity, or any annoying phone calls in attempting to
collect a debt. 13
3
Finally, a debt collector must never use false, deceptive, or
misleading representations in connection with the collection of
any debt.13 4  Such representations not allowed under the Act
include any false statements as to the "character, amount, or legal
status of the debt."135
2. Communications with Third Parties
In addition to communications with consumers, the FDCPA
tightly regulates communications with third parties concerning
the collection of any debt. Section 1692c(b) provides that a debt
collector may not communicate regarding debt collection with any
person other than the consumer debtor, his attorney, a consumer
reporting agency if otherwise permitted by law, the creditor, the
attorney of the creditor, or the debtor's attorney, without the prior
consent of the consumer debtor. 136  This section, however, does
not prohibit the debt collector from communicating directly with
the consumer debtor, or with a third party, once permission is
obtained from "a court of competent jurisdiction, or if it is reason-
ably necessary to effectuate a postjudgment judicial remedy. '37
As for communications concerning other purposes, section
1692b provides that a debt collector may communicate with any
person other than the consumer in order to acquire location infor-
mation about the consumer. 13 8 This section requires the debt col-
lector to identify himself and state that his purpose is to confirm
or correct information concerning the location of the consumer. 139
132. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692d. See also Fox v. Citicorp Credit Serv., Inc., 15 F. 3d
1507, 1516 (9th Cir. 1994) (holding threatening and intimidating calls to a
consumer at an inconvenient time or place could rationally support a jury finding
of harassing conduct; communications at a place known to be inconvenient to the
consumer may also violate 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(a)(1)); Staff Commentary, supra
note 28, at 50105.
133. 15 U.S.C. §§ 1692d(1)-(2), (5).
134. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e. See also Crossley v. Lieberman, 868 F.2d 566 (3d
Cir. 1989) (holding attorney's communication to the debtor which implied that a
mortgage foreclosure case was already in litigation violated the FDCPA).
135. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692e(2)(A).
136. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692c(b).
137. Id.
138. 15 U.S.C. § 1692b.
139. 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(1).
1996]
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However, the debt collector must not reveal to the third party that
the consumer owes a debt.140
If the debt collector knows the consumer has an attorney
whose name and address is readily available, the debt collector
must not communicate with any person other than the consumer's
attorney unless the attorney fails to respond to the debt collector's
communication within a reasonable period of time. 14 1
D. Civil Liability Under the FDCPA
An attorney who meets the statutory definition of a debt col-
lector and who thereafter violates the FDCPA could face a lawsuit
in federal court by the person from whom the attorney initially
attempted to collect the debt. Consumer'debtors may bring such
lawsuits in any United States federal district court or other court
of competent jurisdiction, notwithstanding the amount in contro-
versy, within one year of the violation. 142 Even if the consumer
admits to owing the entire debt he still maintains standing to
assert violations of the FDCPA.1
43
In these lawsuits the consumer-debtor may seek actual dam-
ages, statutory damages (up to one thousand dollars), the costs of
the action, and reasonable attorney's fees. 144 Recovery is not lim-
140. 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(2).
141. See generally 15 U.S.C. § 1692b(1)-(5).
142. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(d).
143. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k. See also Riveria v. MAB Collections, Inc., 682 F.Supp.
174, 175-76 (W.D.N.Y. 1988) (holding the FDCPA is a strict liability statute;
proof of one violation is sufficient to support summary judgment for the plaintiff);
Ayala v. Dial Adjustment Bureau, Inc., Civil No. N-86-315 (EEB) (D. Conn. Dec.
4, 1986).
144. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a). Section 1692k(a) states:
Amount of Damages-Except as otherwise provided by this section, any
debt collector who fails to comply with any provision of this subchapter
with respect to any person is liable to such person for an amount equal
to the sum of:
(1) any actual damage sustained by such person as a result of such
failure;
(2)(A) in the case of any action by an individual, such additional
damages as the court may allow, but not exceeding $1,000; or
(B) in the case of a class action, (I) such amount for each named plaintiff
as could be recovered under subparagraph (A), and (ii) such amount as
the court may allow for all other class members, without regard to a
minimum individual recovery, not to exceed the lesser of $500,000 or 1
per centum of the net worth of the debt collector; and
(3) in the case of any successful action to enforce the foregoing liability,
the costs of the action, together with a reasonable attorney's fee as
[Vol. 18:165
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ited to just one type of the specified damages listed under the Act,
but debtors may recover one or all of the damages listed. 145
Actual damages may include recovery for a broad spectrum of
harm including emotional distress and anguish. 146  Statutory
damages under the Act are not determined per violation, but per
action, such that the one thousand dollar amount represents the
statutory maximum in a single action for one or more viola-
tions.1 47 Moreover, an award of statutory damages does not
require proof of actual damages. 148
The FDCPA further provides that any debt collector who fails
to comply with the Act becomes liable, for reasonable attorney's
fees and costs of the action. 149 In determining the amount of
attorney's fees, the Supreme Court recently held that "the most
critical factor in determining the reasonableness of a fee award is
determined by the court. On a finding by the court that an action under
this section was brought in bad faith and for the purpose of harassment,
the court may award to the defendant attorney's fees reasonable in
relation to the work expended and costs.
145. Harvey v. United Adjusters, 509 F. Supp. 1218 (D. Ore. 1981) (holding
plaintiff may recover for any actual damages he sustained as well as attorney
fees and costs of litigation).
146. Teng v. Metropolitan Retail Recovery Inc., 851 F. Supp. 61, 69 (E.D.N.Y.
1994). In Teng, a debt collection agency and its employees falsely represented to
debtor that there was an emergency family crises. The court allowed recovery for
the emotional distress the employee suffered as a result of the false statements
made by the collection agency. See also Donahue v. NFS Inc., 781 F. Supp. 188
(W.D.N.Y. 1991) (holding that the right to recover actual damages under the
FDCPA for emotional distress is independent of the right, if any, to recover
damages for emotional distress under state law).
147. See Harper v. Better Business Services, 961 F.2d.1561 (11th Cir. 1992);
Beattie v. D.M. Collections, Inc., 764 F. Supp. 925 (D. Del. 1991) (holding that
additional damages shall not exceed $1,000; the maximum additional damages of
$1,000 are to be awarded for each case, not for each violation or improper
communication); Masuda v. Thomas Richards & Co., 759 F. Supp. 1456 (C.D.
Cal. 1991); Cacace v. Lucas, 775 F. Supp. 502 (D. Conn. 1990).
148. Baker v. G.C. Serv. Corp., 677 F.2d 775, 780-81 (9th Cir.1982); Woolfolk
v. Van Ru Credit Corp., 783 F. Supp 724, 727 (1990); Traverso v. Sharinn, Civil
No. N-88-446 (WWE), 1989 WL 265042 (D. Conn. Sept. 15, 1989); Riveria v.
MAB Collections, Inc., 682 F. Supp. 174, 177 (W.D.N.Y. 1988); Harvey v. United
Adjusters, 509 F. Supp. 1218, 1221-22 (D. Ore. 1981).
149. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(a)(3); See also Graziano v. Harrison, 950 F.2d 107 (3d
Cir. 1991); Pipiles v. Credit Bureau of Lockport, Inc., 886 F.2d 22, 28 (2d Cir.
1989) (holding that upon establishing the defendant's violation of the FDCPA, an
award of attorney fees is mandatory); Emanuel v. American Credit Exch., 870
F.2d 805, 809 (2d Cir. 1989).
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the degree of success obtained."150  If, however, a court deter-
mines that an action brought under the FDCPA was brought in
bad faith or for harrassment purposes, the court in its discretion
may award the defendant attorney's fees reasonable in relation to
the work performed and the costs assumed. 15 1Finally, in determining the total liability under the FDCPA,
the court must consider, among other relevant factors, the: 1) fre-
quency and persistence of noncompliance by the debt collector; 2)
nature of the noncompliance; and 3) extent to which such noncom-
pliance was intentional. 152
E. Defenses Available to Attorneys Under the FDCPA
Attorneys sued under the FDCPA may assert some defenses
depending on circumstances surrounding the debt collection, and
their status as debt collectors.
First, an attorney may assert an affirmative statutory defense
negating liability where the attorney "showsby a preponderance
of the evidence that the violation was not intentional," but the
result of a bona fide error notwithstanding reasonable procedures
adopted to avoid any such error. 53  Courts, however, are gener-
ally reluctant to apply the bone fide error exception. 154 For exam-
150. Farrar v. Hobby, 113 S. Ct. 566, 574 (1992) (applying 42 U.S.C. § 1988).
See Texas State Teachers Ass'n. v. Garland Indep. School Dist., 489 U.S. 782,
789 (1989) (applying 42 U.S.C. § 1988); Hensley v. Eckerhart, 461 U.S. 424,
433-37 (1983) (applying 42 U.S.C. § 1988). Among other factors the court may
consider in determining an appropriate attorney fee is the degree of success
obtained by the prevailing plaintiff; if the plaintiff has only partial or limited
success, a reduction in the award of attorney's fees may be appropriate. Hensley,
461 U.S. at 434-37. Additionally, the court should assess the reasonableness of
the hours expended by the attorney for the prevailing party. Id. at 433-34.
151. Johnson v. Eaton, 884 F. Supp 1068, 1071 (M.D. La. 1995). See also Perry
v. Stewart Title Co., 756 F.2d 1197, 1211 (5th Cir. 1985) modified on other
grounds, 761 F.2d 237 (5th Cir. 1985); Knowles v. Credit Bureau of Rochester,
No. 91-CV-145, 1992 WL 131107 (W.D.N.Y. May 28, 1992).
152. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(b).
153. 15 U.S.C. § 1692k(c). See also Fox. v. Citicorp, 15 F.3d 150, 1514 (9th Cir.
1994) (holding that the bona fide error exemption is an affirmative defense,
which the mover has the burden of proof at trial); Smith v. Transworld Sys., Inc.,
953 F.2d 1025 (6th Cir. 1992) (finding collection agency which ceased collection
activities after receipt of consumer's cease and desist letter, but subsequently
sent a second letter due to a clerical mistake, fell under the bone fide error
exception); Johnson v. Eaton, 884 F. Supp. 1068 (M.D. La. 1995).
154. See Baker v. G.C. Serv. Corp., 677 F.2d 775 (9th Cir. 1982) (holding that
reliance on advice of counsel or mistake about the law is insufficient by itself to
raise a bone fide error defense).
194 [Vol. 18:165
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ple, in Cacace v. Lucas, the court held the exception did not apply
where an attorney failed to prove by a preponderance of evidence
that his letter overstating the debt amount was due to a bona fide
error notwithstanding reasonable procedures adapted to avoid the
error. 
155
Another possible defense that may be applicable depends on
the attorney creditor relationship. If there is any debate concern-
ing such relationship, the attorney may raise the issue that he is
not an outside party collecting a debt, but in-house counsel for the
creditor. Under the Act the term "debt collector" does not include
those collecting debts for corporate affiliates "if the person acting
as a debt collector does so only for persons to whom it is so related
or affiliated and if the principal business of such person is not the
collection of debts."156  Therefore, in-house counsel collecting a
debt for their affiliate corporation are not subject to the provisions
of the FDCPA.
V. TiE FDCPA, STATE STATUTES COVERING DEBT COLLECTION,
AND TORT REMEDIES
Many states have enacted statues to protect consumers from
oppressive and abusive debt collection practices. State debt collec-
tion statutes are not annulled by the FDCPA.157 Section 1692n of
the FDCPA provides in pertinent part that the Act:
[D]oes not annul, alter, or affect, or exempt any person subject
to the provisions of [the Act] from complying with the laws of any
state with respect to debt collection practices, except to the extent
that those laws are inconsistent with any provision of [the Act],
and then only to the extent of the inconsistency.
158
The Act further provides that state laws involving debt collection
are not inconsistent with the FDCPA if the state law affords the
consumer greater protection than does the FDCPA. 15
9
Since the FDCPA applies to any person collecting a debt owed
or due a third party, any state law that defines "debt collector" as
any person or collection agency in general provides greater protec-
155. 775 F. Supp. 502, 506 (D. Conn. 1990).
156. 15 U.S.C. § 1692a(6)(B).
157. 15 U.S.C. § 1692n. See generally Joel E. Smith, Annotation, Validity,
Construction, and Application of State Statutes Prohibiting Abusive or Coercive
Debt Collection Practices, 87 A.L.R.3d 786 (1978 & Supp. 1995).
158. 15 U.S.C. § 1692n.
159. Id. See 15 U.S.C. § 1692o. See generally Smith, supra note 157.
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tion than the FDCPA. 16 1 Such a statute may give greater deffer-
ence to the debtor with respect to certain types of
communications, thus affording the general public greater protec-
tion from harassing communications.
A. North Carolina's Statute Concerning Debt Collection
North Carolina General Statute section 75-50, entitled "Pro-
hibited Acts by Debt Collectors," provides specifically what debt
collectors may and may riot do.16 1 The statute defines "debt col-
lector" as "any person engaging directly or indiretly, in debt col-
lection from a consumer."1 62
Like the FDCPA, the North Carolina Act prohibits debt collec-
tors from using unfair threats or coercion in attempting to collect
any debt.163  The statute sets forth specific examples of prohib-
160. See generally Smith, supra note 157.
161. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-50 (1994).
162. Id.
163. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-51 (1994). Section 75-51 states:
Threats and coercion.
No debt collector shall collect or attempt to collect any debt alleged to be
due and owing from a consumer by means of any unfair threat, coercion,
or attempt to coerce. Such unfair acts include, but are not limited to, the
following:
(1) Using or threatening to use violence or any illegal means to cause
harm to the person, reputation or property of any person.
(2) Falsely accusing or threatening to accuse any person of fraud or any
crime, or of any conduct that would tend to cause disgrace, contempt or
ridicule.
(3) Making or threatening to make false accusations to another
person,including any credit reporting agency, that a consumer has not
paid, or has willfully refused to pay a just debt.
(4) Threatening to sell or assign, or to refer to another for collection, the
debt of the consumer with an attending representation that the result of
such sale, assignment or reference would be that the consumer would
lose any defense to the debt or would be subjected to harsh, vindictive,
or abusive collection attempts.
(5) Representing that nonpayment of an alleged debt may result in the
arrest of any person.
(6) Representing that nonpayment of an alleged debt may result in the
seizure, garnishment, attachment, or sale of any property or wages
unless such action is in fact contemplated by the debt collector and
permitted by law.
(7) Threatening to take any action not in fact taken in the usual
courseof business, unless it can be shown that such threatened action
was actually intended to be taken in the particular case in which the
threat was made.
[Vol. 18:165196
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ited techniquies which include: 1) falsely accusing the debtor of a
crime or failing to pay, 2) threatening to use violence to collect
adebt, and 3) threatening to sell or assign the debt to someone else
for collection. 164
North Carolina's statute also prohibits debt collectors from
using any conduct which harrasses or abuses a consumer
debtor.165 Moreover, the debt collector may not use any uncon-
scionable means in his attempts to collect any debt. 166 Addition-
ally, debt collectors may not unreasonably publicize any
(8) Threatening to take any action not permitted by law.
164. Id.
165. N.C. GEN. STAT § 75-52 (1994). Section 75-52 states:
Harassment
No debt collector shall use any conduct, the natural' consequence of
which is to oppress, harass, or abuse any person in connection with the
attempt to collect any debt. Such unfair acts include, but are not limited
to, the following:
(1) Using profane or obscene language, or language that would
ordinarily abuse the typical hearer or reader.
(2) Placing collect telephone calls or sending collect telegrams
unless the caller fully identifies himself and the company he
represents.
(3) Causing a telephone to ring or engaging any person in telephone
conversation with such frequency as to be unreasonable or to
constitute a harassment to the person under the circumstances or at
times known to be times other than normal waking hours of the
person.
(4) Placing telephone calls or attempting to communicate with any
person, contrary to his instructions, at his place of employment,
unless the debt collector does not have a telephone number where
the consumer can be reached during the. consumer's nonworking
hours.
166. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-55 (1994). Section 75-55 states:
Unconscionable means.
No debt collector shall collect or attempt to collect any debt by use of any
unconscionable means. Such means include, but are not limited to, the
following:
(1) Seeking or obtaining any written statement or acknowledgment in
any form containing an affirmation of any debt by a consumer who has
been declared bankrupt, an acknowledgment of any debt barred by the
statute of limitations, or a waiver of any legal rights of the debtor
without disclosing the nature and consequences of such affirmation or
waiver and the fact that the consumer is not legally obligated to make
such affirmation or waiver.
(2) Collecting or attempting to collect from the consumer all or any part
of the debt collector's fee or charge for services rendered, collecting or
attempting to collect any interest or other charge, fee or expense
19961
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information regarding the consumer's debt. 16 7 Examples of such
publication include any communication with any person other
than the debtor or his attorney.
168
Finally, the North Carolina Act prohibits a debt collector from
using fraudulent, deceptive, or misleading representations while
attempting to collect or obtain information concerning a consumer
incidental to the principal debt unless legally entitled to such fee or
charge.
(3) Communicating with a consumer (other than a statement of account
used in the normal course of business) whenever the debt collector has
been notified by the consumer's attorney that he represents said
consumer.
(4) Bringing suit against the debtor in a county other than that in which
the debt was incurred or in which the debtor resides if the distances and
amounts involved would make it impractical for the debtor to defend the
claim.
167. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-53 (1994). Section 75-53 states:
Unreasonable publication.
No debt collector shall unreasonably publicize information regarding a
consumer's debt. Such unreasonable publication includes, but is not
limited to, the following:
(1) Any communication with any person other than the debtor or his
attorney, except:
a. With the written permission of the debtor or his attorney given
after default;
b. To persons employed by the debt collector, to a credit reporting
agency, to a person or business employed to collect the debt on
behalf of the creditor, or to a person who makes a legitimate request
for the information;
c. To the spouse (or one who stands in place of the spouse) of the
debtor, or to the parent or guardian of the debtor if the debtor is a
minor and lives in the same household with such parent;
d. For the sole purpose of locating the debtor, if no indication of
indebtedness is made;
e. Through legal process.
(2) Using any form of communication which ordinarily would be seen or
heard by any person other than the consumer that displays or conveys
any information about the alleged debt other than the name, address
and phone number of the debt collector except as otherwise provided in
this Article.
(3) Disclosing any information relating to a consumer's debt by
publishing or posting any list of consumers, except for credit reporting
purposes and the publication and distribution of otherwise permissible
"stop lists" to the point-of-sale locations where the credit is extended, or
by advertising for sale any claim to enforce payment thereof or in any
other manner other than through legal process.
168. Id.
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debt. 169 In Forsyth Memorial Hospital v. Contreras, the North
Carolina Court of Appeals held communications to a debtor did
not violate North Carolina's Deceptive Misrepresentation stat-
ute. 1 70 In this case, the hospital's collection procedures for delin-
quent accounts were handled through its holding company.1 71
The holding company mailed correspondence to the plaintiff-
debtor under the letterhead of the vice president for legal affairs
for the holding company without indicating the affiliation between
the holding company and the hospital. 172  Plaintiff-debtor filed
suit alleging that these written communications led him to believe
169. N.C. GEN. STAT. § 75-54 (1994). Section 75-54 states:
Deceptive representation.
No debt collector shall collect or attempt to collect a debt or obtain
information concerning a consumer by any fraudulent, deceptive or
misleading representation. Such representations include, but are not
limited to, the following:
(1) Communicating with the consumer other than in the name (or
unique pseudonym) of the debt collector and the person or business on
whose behalf the debt collector is acting or to whom the debt is owed.
(2) Failing to disclose in all communications attempting to collect a debt
that the purpose of such communication is to collect a debt.
(3) Falsely representing that the debt collector has in his possession
information or something of value for the consumer.
(4) Falsely representing the character, extent, or amount of a debt
against a consumer or of its status in any legal proceeding; falsely
representing that the collector is in any way connected with any agency
of the federal, State or local government; or falsely representing the
creditor's rights or intentions.
(5) Using or distributing or selling any written communication which
simulates or is falsely represented to be a document authorized, issued,
or approved by a court, an official, or any other legally constituted or
authorized authority, or which creates a false impression about its
source.
(6) Falsely representing that an existing obligation of the consumer
may be increased by the addition of attorney's fees, investigation fees,
service fees, or any other fees or charges.
(7) Falsely representing the status or true nature of the services
rendered by the debt collector or his business.
170. 107 N.C. App. 611, 421 S.E.2d 167 (1992), cert. denied 333 N.C. 344, 426
S.E.2d 705 (1993).
171. Id. See also Spinks v. Taylor, 303 N.C. 256, 278 S.E.2d 501 (1981)
(holding that a padlocking notice posted by the defendant landlord on the doors
of tenants who were late paying their rent did not simulate legal process in
violation of this section, since the notice in question contained no signatures, no
seal, no mention of an official or of a court, no date, and no reference to an
amount due).
172. Contreras, 107 N.C. App. at 614, 421 S.E.2d at 169 (1992).
1996] 199
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the matter had been turned over to an independent attorney or
independent third-party agency for collection.' 73 The court of
appeals held the vice. president's communications were not decep-
tive communications in that they did not constitute a communica-
tion with the consumer other than in the name of the debt
collector. 174
B. Beware of Tort Remedies Where Neither the FDCPA Nor a
State Statute Applies
If there is a case where there is no state statute prohibiting
abusive debt collection practices and the FDCPA is not applicable,
as in cases where the debt collector is the creditor himself, there
are various tort theories a debtor may' pursue for any damages;
suffered as a result of abusive debt collection practices. Theories
include libel and slander, invasion of privacy, intentional infliction
of mental anguish, negligent infliction of emotional distress, false
imprisonment, abuse of process, and assault and battery. 1 75
VI. CONCLUSION
The recent decision of the United States Supreme Court in
Heintz v. Jenkins extinguishes any doubt concerning the current
status of attorneys under the FDCPA. Heintz clearly provides
that attorneys qualifyng under the FDCPA's definition of a debt
collector must comply with the Act's provisions. Failure to com-
ply with these provisions subjects the attorney to potential civil
liability to the debtor.
Ambiguity still remains, however, surrounding the term "debt
collector" as defined by the FDCPA. What is meant by "regularly
173. Id.
174. Id.
175. See Smith, supra note 157. A debtor may be able to seek relief from
abusive debt collection pratices under the Unfair and Deceptive Trade Practices
Acts or any other consumer Sales Act. Id. See also Liggins v. May Co., 4 Ohio
Misc. 81, 337 N.E.2d 816 (1975) (holding the term "consumer transaction" as
used in the applicable state deceptive consumer sales practices act prohibiting
deceptive acts or practices in connection with a consumer transaction, to include
the collection of, or the attempt to collect on, a debt owed by a consumer);
"Actionable Practices in Debt Collection," 18 Am. Jur. Proof of Facts § 59 (1967)
(discussing generally liability for abusive debt collection practices, and
subsections 24-31 discussing actionable practices and debt collection); "Action for
Harassment of Debtor," 16 Am. Jur. Trials § 619, (1969) (detailing practices,
techniques, and tactics for preparing and trying cases for actions regarding the
harassment of a debtor).
200 [Vol. 18:165
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attempting" to collect consumer debts? Does it mean consistent
collection of one or more consumer debts a month, or does it mean
a majority of your practice is specifically dedicated to debt collec-
tion? Without a final determination on this issue, attorneys who
collect any type of consumer debts, from foreclosures to delinquent
accounts, should beware the FDCPA.
Finally, beware state debt collection statutes. They can be
more restrictive than the FDCPA, thus subjecting the debt collec-
tor to even greater liability than the federal counterpart. In
conclusion, attorneys can no longer assert their law degrees as
defenses from liability under either federal or state debt collection
legislation. Attorneys collecting consumer debts must learn the
provisions of the FDCPA and abide by them if they want to avoid
liability.
David Hilton
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